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Abstract
A significant loss of income can have a negative impact on households
who are forced to reduce their consumption of some particular staple
goods. This can lead to health issues and consequently generates signif-
icant costs for society. In order to prevent these negative consequences,
we suggest that consumers can buy an insurance to have a sufficient
amount of staple good in case they lose a part of their income. We
develop a two–period/two–good Principal–Agent problem with adverse
selection and endogenous reservation utility to model an insurance with
in kind benefits. This model allows us to obtain semi–explicit solutions
for the insurance contract and is applied to the context of fuel poverty.
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Introduction
This article examines a short–term solution to protect vulnerable house-
holds from the risk of temporary poverty in a particular staple good. Staple
goods are essential products that consumers are unable, or unwilling, to cut
out of their budgets, such as food, beverage, water, energy... They tend to
consume staples goods at a relatively constant level, regardless of price or
their financial situation. However, in the event of a substantial loss of income,
consumers will reduce the budget allocated to some staple goods, such as fresh
food, energy, medicines or feminine hygiene products, which can lead to se-
rious illnesses. Indeed, these particular staple goods may not seem essential
to poor consumers, unlike food or water. A poor household, facing the choice
of heating, healing or eating, will systematically make the choice to eat. This
question has been the subject of many surveys and discussions on this type of
goods which, for households in a very precarious situation, can be considered,
in a sense, as a luxury. In particular, we can mention the works of Milne and
Molana [1991], Freeman [2003] for health care, and Meier et al. [2013], Schulte
and Heindl [2017] for energy. We focus in this paper on this particular type
of staple goods, whose consumption is strongly impacted by income losses.
Since we are focusing on modest households, who are not used to saving
money in anticipation of the future, a loss of income would force them to reduce
their consumption of some particular basic commodities, such as residential
heating, which could lead to health issues (see Lacroix and Chaton [2015]).
A common solution would be to offer an income insurance that will provide
money to the household in the event of an income loss. However, in the
situation under consideration, the household will probably spend the money
received to buy products that are more essential from its point of view. This
type of insurance thus appears not to be an appropriate solution to the problem
we are confronted with. Therefore, our suggestion is rather an in–kind support
than a financial assistance: if the household suffers from a loss of income, it
will receive a specified amount of the particular good under consideration,
ensuring an adequate consumption in that good. This approach, despite the
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fact that it could be perceived as paternalistic, should protect individuals from
the negative effects of some of their decisions, and thus prevent the health
issues associated with the lack of this good. Indeed, many articles show the
effectiveness of in–kind support compared to financial one to fight poverty,
such as Blackorby and Donaldson [1988] or Slesnick [1996].
Our objective is therefore to develop an insurance dedicated to a particular
good, in order to guarantee the insured household a sufficient consumption of
this product, in the event of an income loss. Since the risk of income loss
is different among the considered population, there is a need to offer a menu
of contracts: the insurer should provide different types of insurance, to let
each household choose the best suited for its need and risk. Offering a menu
of contracts is relatively traditional in the insurance field (see the survey of
Dionne et al. [2013]), it allows the insurer to fight against the asymmetry
of information between him and the insured, in particular against adverse
selection. In general, in insurance problems, this asymmetry is related to the
risk to which the insured is exposed, and it is assumed in most models that the
insured knows better his own risk than the insurance company. In our context,
this assumption seems reasonable since the insured has a better estimate of
his risk of income loss than the insurer.
The field of insurance models with adverse selection can be divided into
two categories, depending on the status of the insurer. In the first category,
authors are considering insurance as a model of pure competition between in-
surance companies, which implies that the price of insurance is set such that
insurers do not make any profit. One of the leading models in this trend
is the RS model of Rothschild and Stiglitz [1976] and its various extensions
(see Boone [2015], Chassagnon and Chiappori [1997], De Donder and Hindriks
[2009], Cook and Graham [1977], Alary and Bien [2008], Janssen and Karamy-
chev [2005] and the survey of Mimra and Wambach [2014]). Our model will
be classified in the second (more technically difficult and unfortunately less
developed) category: we will assume that the insurer is a monopoly. In this
literature, we can mention among others the extension of the RS model to
a monopoly by Stiglitz [1977], or more generally the class of models with
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adverse selection (not in the field of insurance) developed by Mirrlees [1971],
Spence [1974], Guesnerie and Laffont [1984], Salanié [2005], Laffont and Marti-
mort [2009] and their extensions to multi–products by, for example, Armstrong
[1996], or in continuous–time by Alasseur et al. [2019]. The most reasonable
justification for the choice of a monopoly model is that, for the application
we have in mind, namely a fuel–poverty1 insurance, the best suited insurer is
the customer’s current energy supplier, who knows his client better than other
companies. Moreover, since the insurer is a monopoly, the household only has
the choice between purchasing an insurance contract, among those offered by
the monopoly, or not. As a result, we consider that the household refuse any
contracts if none provides it more utility than its utility without insurance,
defined as the reservation utility, which thus depend on its risk.
Inspired by the literature on standard contract theory with adverse selec-
tion, mainly through pioneering works of Baron and Myerson [1982], Guesnerie
and Laffont [1984], Maskin and Riley [1984], and the few applications to in-
surance problems such as Stiglitz [1977], Landsberger and Meilijson [1994,
1996], we model this situation as a Principal–Agent problem with adverse se-
lection. The Principal (She – an insurance company, a supplier...) can offer
an insurance to the Agent (he – a household), which allows him to receive a
specified amount of the staple good under consideration, in the event of a loss
of income. We assume that the adverse selection concerns the Agent’s prob-
ability of income loss, defined as his type. This assumption is classical in the
literature, particularly in all extensions of Rothschild and Stiglitz [1976] and
Stiglitz [1977]. The reservation utility we considered will thus depend on the
Agent’s type. The problem of an endogenous reservation utility is studied in
some adverse selection models such as Lewis and Sappington [1989], Biglaiser
and Mezzetti [1993], Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare [1995], Jullien [2000], and
Alasseur et al. [2019] also discuss this issue for an application close to the one
we have in mind. However, to the best of our knowledge, this problem is rarely
1According to the french law Grenelle 2: "A person in a fuel poverty situation is a person
who has particular difficulties in his/her home in obtaining the necessary supply of energy to
meet his/her basic needs because of the inadequacy of his/her resources or living conditions."
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addressed for a continuum of types in insurance models, as in our framework.
One of the cornerstone of our approach is to combine a model of consump-
tion (two goods and a budget constraint) with traditional insurance models
under adverse selection. Another particularity of our method lies in the choice
of a two–period insurance model, as in Schlesinger and Zhuang [2014, 2019].
Most of the literature on insurance with adverse selection is focusing on only
one period, where the Agent pays and receives the insurance at the same time,
or repeated versions of this scheme. The closest application where this type
of two–period models are being developed is self–prevention. In the works of
Eeckhoudt et al. [2012], Wang and Li [2015], Peter [2017] (model with savings)
or Menegatti [2009], Courbage and Rey [2012] (without savings), the authors
consider a two–period model to account for the delay between the prevention
effort and the real benefit of it. In our framework, a two–period model is neces-
sary to model the fact that the insured is not in a precarious situation when he
subscribes to the insurance to be covered over the next period. Considering a
two–period model also allows us to compare, with and without insurance, the
evolution of the Agent’s consumption, when he suffers from a loss of income.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The Principal–Agent
model for insurance with two periods, two goods and endogenous reservation
utility is detailed in Section 1. Section 2 presents the benchmark case, i.e.
the problem without adverse selection. Under adverse selection, the problem
is solved in Section 3. Through a simple but not simplistic model, we obtain
the most explicit results possible. In particular, we find the optimal design for
the menu of contracts, and we study the Agent’s optimal choice of contract
and consumption. A remarkable feature of our problem is that the optimal
menu of contracts excludes the less risky Agents. We apply our results to the
context of fuel poverty. By numerical simulations, we show that our insurance
with benefits in kind can be a tool to help the riskiest Agents to consume a
sufficient quantity of electricity in the case of an income loss. To our opinion,
this type of insurance can therefore protect risky Agents from fuel–poverty.
Section 4 concludes by suggesting some policy recommendations.
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1 The model
1.1 A Principal–Agent model with adverse selection
We consider a two–period/two–good Principal–Agent model with adverse
selection. The Agent, He, represents a household consuming the essential
good considered and another representative good. More precisely, at each
time t P t0, 1u, the Agent has an income wt which allows him to consume a
quantity et of the considered staple good and a quantity yt of another good,
with respective unitary constant positive price pe and py. However, between
the two periods, the Agent is likely to suffer from a loss of income, which will
put him in a precarious situation at time t “ 1: he will be constrained to reduce
his consumption. However, if he does not consume a sufficient quantity of the
staple good, this can lead to serious issues of which the Agent is not necessarily
aware. To prevent him from staple good poverty, the risk–neutral Principal,
she, who may be the good producer or supplier, an insurance company, or even
the government, offers an insurance. This insurance ensures that the Agent
receives a specified quantity of the staple good, denoted emin, in the event of
an income loss. At time t “ 0, the Agent thus chooses if he wants to subscribe
to the insurance and if so, he pays the insurance premium T associated to a
contractible quantity emin. At time t “ 1, if he has purchased the insurance
and if his income has decreased sufficiently, the Agent receives the quantity
emin of the staple good.
We define the random income of an Agent of type ε at time t “ 1 by
w1 :“ ωw0 where w0 is the income at time t “ 0 and ω is a random variable,
defined on the probability space pΩ,A,Pεq, where Ω is a subset in R` and A
its natural σ´algebra. We assume that the insurance is activated when ω ď rω,
where the income loss barrier rω is set in an exogenous way. In order to obtain
closed–form solutions, we will make the following assumption:
Assumption 1.1. The random variable ω takes two values, ω with probability
ε and sω with probability 1´ ε, where ε P r0, 1s and sω ą rω ě ω ą 0.
We assume that the constants ω and sω are common knowledge. The in-
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equality sω ą rω ě ω means that the insurance is only activated when ω “ ω.
This model for the distribution of losses is traditional in insurance models
based on the pioneer works of Rothschild and Stiglitz [1976] and Stiglitz [1977].
We consider that the Agent is better informed than the Principal about the
risk of income loss he is facing, which depends on his work quality, his job
insecurity, the relation he has with his supervisor... The Principal has only
access to an overview of risks among the population, which leads to an adverse
selection problem, precisely defined by the following assumption.
Assumption 1.2 (Adverse Selection). The Principal cannot observe the type
of an Agent, but knows the distribution of the types of her potential clients.
As classical in adverse selection problems, the Principal has interest in
offering a menu of contracts, i.e. various emin with associated premium T .
The agent then chooses the contract that best suits him among all contracts
offered by the Principal, depending on his risk. In our study, we look for the
best continuous menu of contracts that the insurer can offer.
1.2 Agent’s problem
In most insurance models, the utility function of the Agent is not specified.
With the aim of obtaining the most explicit results possible, we choose here
to represent the preferences of the Agent toward the goods’ consumption, at
time t, by a separable utility function based on logarithmic felicities:
Upet, ytq :“ α lnpetq ` lnpytq, for et, yt ą 0, (1.1)
where α parametrises the longview elasticity of substitution between the staple
good and the composite one.
Our model does not take into account the possibility for the Agent to save
between the two periods (contrary to Schlesinger and Zhuang [2014]). This
hypothesis may seem restrictive but is consistent with the literature on two–
period models (in particular on prevention with Menegatti [2009], Courbage
and Rey [2012]) and is justified in our framework in view of the particular
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households2 on which we want to focus our study. Indeed, one can assume
that a household already used to saving has built up sufficient funds to pay
its bills in the event of a loss of income. This household should thus not be
concerned by the insurance we develop throughout this paper, unless it has
inadequate savings. In fact, our insurance can precisely be interpreted as a
form of incentive to save: it is a way for households, who have no savings,
to obtain a quantity of staple good in case of an income loss. The concept
of insurance is very effective in this type of situation, and allows risks to be
shared among the population. Moreover, this choice of model is also based on
the willingness to keep a tractable model with (relatively) explicit solutions,
and to focus our study on the design of insurance contracts. In parallel with
Menegatti [2009] for prevention, the interaction between insurance and savings
in a two–period model is a different problem, but could represent a potentially
interesting extension for future work.
1.2.1 Reservation utility
Without insurance, the Agent maximises, independently at each period t,
the utility previously defined, under his budget constraint:
V ∅pwtq :“ maxpet,ytqPR2` Upet, ytq, u.c. etpe ` ytpy ď wt. (1.2)
Given a discount factor β P r0, 1s, we define the intertemporal expected utility
without insurance of an Agent of type ε as follows:
EU∅pεq :“ V ∅pw0q ` βEPε
“
V ∅pωw0q
‰
. (1.3)
2Households that do not save but want to are widespread, as evidenced by the many
mobile applications or services to help them. For example, the mobile application Birdycent
rounds up each payment made by the consumer to feed a piggy bank, with a zero interest
rate, which is equivalent to losing money in relation to inflation. A second application,
called Yeeld, offers 4% in cash back on Amazon instead of an interest rate. The bank Crédit
Mutuel proposes the service Budget +, which is subject to a fee, to automatically save from
a current account to a savings one. In our opinion, this highlights the need to encourage
households to save money and that they are willing to pay for these types of services.
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In our framework, the Agent is likely to accept the insurance contract only if it
provides him a level of utility at least equal to his utility without. Therefore,
the reservation utility of an Agent of type ε will be defined3 by (1.3).
1.2.2 Expected utility with insurance
Let us now fix an insurance contract pemin, T q. If the Agent decides to sub-
scribe to this contract, we assume that the payment of the insurance premium
T only impacts his budget constraint at time t “ 0, and his maximum utility
is thus naturally given by:
V0pw0, T q :“ V ∅pw0 ´ T q. (1.4)
As described in Subsection 1.1, the insurance we consider is an in–kind support:
it ensures the Agent a fixed non–negative amount emin ě 0 of a determined
staple good at time t “ 1, if he suffers from a sufficient loss of income, i.e. if
ω “ ω. Therefore, his maximisation problem is:
V1pωw0, eminq :“ maxpe1,y1qPR2` Upe1 ` emin1ω“ω, y1q, (1.5)
u.c. e1pe ` y1py ď ωw0.
Similarly to the case without insurance, we define the intertemporal expected
utility of an Agent of type ε, with an insurance contract pemin, T q, by:
EUQpε, emin, T q :“ V0pw0, T q ` βEPε
“
V1pωw0, eminq
‰
. (1.6)
1.3 The Principal’s problem
We assume that the Principal is risk–neutral4 and wants to maximise her
profit: she receives at time 0 the earnings from the sale of the insurance
3With the aim of simplifying the notations, only the dependency in the type is high-
lighted: the reservation utility is stated as a function of ε.
4The Principal’s risk–neutrality seems reasonable because shareholders of insurance com-
panies generally have a diversified portfolio.
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to Agents of type ε P r0, 1s who agree to subscribe, but needs to provide
them the quantity emin they have chosen if they suffer from an income loss
in the next period. We consider in this model that the insurers are not in
perfect competition, so that the price of the insurance is not determined by
the actuarial price. Therefore, in this monopoly situation, the insurer can
choose the range of emin she wants to offer, but also the price associated to
each quantity. We properly define the notion of admissible contracts and menu
of contracts in our framework:
Definition 1.3. An admissible contract pemin, T q for the insurance is a quan-
tity emin ě 0 with an associated premium T ă w0. An admissible menu is
then defined as a continuum of admissible contracts pemin, T q, i.e. a contin-
uum of non–negative quantities and a continuous price function T defined for
all quantities offered. Under Assumption 1.2, the function price T is required
to be independent of the Agent’s type.
In the First–Best case, the Principal knows the type ε of the Agent, and
can thus offer him a particular contract. Since she has to pay with probability
ε the quantity emin at the unitary price pe, her optimisation problem is:
piε :“ sup
emin,T
`
T ´ εpeemin
˘
, (1.7)
under the constraint that the contract pemin, T q is an admissible contract and
provides the Agent of type ε with at least his reservation utility.
In the Third–Best case, i.e. with adverse selection, we consider a menu
of revealing contracts, in the sense that an Agent of type ε will subscribe to the
insurance contract designed for him, i.e. peminpεq, T pεqq. If the distribution of
the type ε in the population considered by the Principal has a density function
f , the Principal’s problem will be defined as follows:
sup
emin,T
ż 1
0
`
T pεq ´ εpeeminpεq
˘
fpεqdε, (1.8)
under the participation constraint, and where, in this case, emin and T will be
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appropriate functions of ε. To solve this case, we assume that the distribution
of the type ε in the population considered by the Principal is uniform on r0, 1s,
i.e. f “ 1r0,1s. It is equivalent to consider that, from the Principal’s point of
view, an Agent has a probability one half to experience a significant loss of
income. This assumption is actually not necessary, computations could easily
be made for another distribution, but it allows to simplify the Principal’s
problem. This distribution models a Principal who does not really have data
on the Agent’s income loss. This will be the case in the application in question,
where the insurer is an electricity supplier, who is not intended to have insight
on the distribution of the risks of income loss of its customers. Moreover, even
if a probability of one half seems high for the population, the Agents likely to
subscribe to our insurance are rather risky people and the probability in the
population considered by the insurer is necessarily higher than in the global
population. This is particularly true given that our study focuses on middle–
class households without savings, which naturally have a higher probability of
losing income.
1.4 Application to fuel poverty
We apply this model on a particular staple good, the electricity, to develop
an insurance against fuel poverty. According to Chaton and Gouraud [2019],
the fuel poverty is essentially linked to a temporary loss of income. It particu-
larly affects low–income and vulnerable households, with a low propensity to
save, and who already spend a large part of their income on energy. This situ-
ation can lead households to adopt risky behaviours, causing health problems
and housing deterioration (see Lacroix and Chaton [2015]). For example, to
keep heat inside their homes, some obstruct vents, thereby generating moisture
and mould. Households in fuel poverty are often forced to make choices with
harmful consequences for their health: eating or heating, giving up health care
or social interactions. The consequences of fuel poverty are often neglected by
households but are highly expensive for the society. To avoid these harmful
and costly consequences, mechanisms are being developed to help vulnerable
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households. For example, in France, energy vouchers are distributed by the
State since 2018. This voucher can be used to pay for energy expenses such
as electricity, gas, wood and fuel oil bills, but also for energy renovation. In
2019, it targets 5.8 million of households with modest incomes.
The motivation of our work is to act on the prevention side by propos-
ing a complementary tool, to avoid the number of households in fuel poverty
from increasing. The idea is to develop an insurance policy that is activated
if the household becomes energy constrained. Two French electricity suppliers
propose a slightly different insurance: Assurénergie proposed by Electricité de
France (EDF) and Assurance Facture by ENGIE. These two monthly insur-
ances offer a refund of part of the electricity bill in the event of job loss, sick
leave, hospitalisation, disability or death. For the first insurance, the amount
refunded depends on the contract chosen from the proposed menu. The second
insurance is a unique contract. Our goal is to compute the optimal menu of
contracts thanks to contract theory with adverse selection, in order to study
the structure of the contracts obtained, and to know what types of Agents will
be likely to subscribe to the insurance. One can notice that the monopolistic
framework under consideration makes sense in this situation, since the fuel
provider of a household has more inside information than other fuel providers
or classical insurance companies.
2 Benchmark case: the First–Best problem
In this section, we first start by solving the optimal consumption problem
of an Agent of type ε: given an insurance contract pemin, T q, and the utility
function specified in (1.1), we compute the Agent’s optimal consumption in
both goods at each period. As a result, we can compute the maximum utility
the Agent can achieve for a given contract. Comparing this utility with the
reservation utility, we can determine the maximum price the Agent is willing
to pay for the insurance. This first part will allow us to properly define in
our context the participation constraint mentioned in the definition of the
Principal’s problem in Subsection 1.3. With this in mind, we can then solve the
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problem in the First–Best case, i.e. without adverse selection. In particular,
since the Principal knows the type of the Agent, she can offer him a specific
contract, with which his participation constraint is binding. In other words,
she may charge the insurance at the highest price the Agent is willing to pay,
to the point that he is in fact indifferent between subscribing or not to the
insurance.
2.1 Solving the Agent’s problem
We first solve the consumption problem of an Agent who has not subscribed
to the insurance. Let us define the following constant:
Cα,pe,py :“ α lnpαq ´ p1` αq lnp1` αq ´ α lnppeq ´ lnppyq. (2.1)
Since our framework does not allow the Agent to transfer income from one pe-
riod to another, the Agent maximises his utility at each period independently
by solving (1.2), which leads to the following result.
Lemma 2.1 (Without insurance). The optimal consumptions at time t P t0, 1u
in each goods of an Agent with income wt are given by:
y∅t :“ 11` α
wt
py
and e∅t :“ α1` α
wt
pe
,
and induce the maximum utility V ∅pwtq “ p1` αq lnpwtq ` Cα,pe,py .
Then, by a simple computation of the expected utility defined by (1.3), we
can explicitly write the reservation utility:
Proposition 2.2. Under Assumption 1.1, the expected utility without insur-
ance of an Agent of type ε is given by
EU∅pεq “ p1` αq ln `ωβεsωβp1´εqw20˘` p1` βqCα,pe,py . (2.2)
Usually, in insurance models, the reservation utility is taken to be inde-
pendent of the Agent’s type. In our framework, we consider that an Agent
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will not subscribe to the insurance if his utility without is higher. Therefore,
the reservation utility we consider is endogenous, and depends on the prob-
ability ε. This problem is addressed in some adverse selection models, for
example Lewis and Sappington [1989], Biglaiser and Mezzetti [1993], Maggi
and Rodriguez-Clare [1995], Jullien [2000], Alasseur et al. [2019], but is rarely
considered in insurance problems. As explained in Laffont and Martimort
[2009], in this case, determining which participation and incentive constraints
are binding becomes a more difficult task. Nevertheless, Proposition 3.3 will
establish that only the most risky Agents will be selected by the Principal,
and this type of feature only happens in models of countervailing incentives.
The Principal excludes the good types, those with a low probability of losing
their income, because the price they are willing to pay is very low, while the
riskiest Agents are more profitable since they are easily satisfied and willing
to pay much more.
Similarly, we can solve the consumption problem of an Agent who sub-
scribes to a given admissible contract (see Lemmas A.1 and A.2). Without
loss of generality, we can assume that any admissible contract pemin, T q, in the
sense of Definition 1.3, is of the following form:
emin :“ qαωw0{pe, for q P R` and T :“ t0w0, for t0 P r0, 1q. (2.3)
The pair pq, t0q will be referred to as an admissible normalised contract.
We then denote by sU the following function, for q P R`:
sUpqq :“
$&% p1` αq lnp1` qαq if q ă 1,α lnpqq ` p1` αq lnp1` αq if q ě 1. (2.4)
The preliminary results in Appendix A allow us to provide an explicit form in
the following proposition for the expected utility defined by (1.6).
Proposition 2.3. Given an admissible normalised contract pq, t0q, and under
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Assumption 1.1, the expected utility of an insured Agent of type ε is given by:
EUQpε, q, t0q “ EU∅pεq ` p1` αq lnp1´ t0q ` βεsUpqq. (2.5)
Remark 2.4. The separation of cases between q less or greater than 1 is re-
lated to the fact that the Agent is not allowed to resell5 part of the insured
quantity of staple good. If q ă 1, the quantity insured is not sufficient from the
Agent’s point of view. He therefore supplements this quantity by purchasing
additional energy at t “ 1. On the contrary, if q ě 1, the Agent will consume
only the corresponding amount emin of the staple good, his optimal complemen-
tary consumption becoming equal to zero. However, in this case, it could have
been more optimal from his point of view to resell part of the insured quantity.
Nevertheless, it is precisely the purpose of this paper that the household con-
sumes more of this particular good, in order to avoid the problems induced by
a decrease in consumption, of which the household is not aware.
It remains to determine when the Agent of type ε will subscribe the in-
surance, i.e. when his expected utility with the insurance is greater than his
reservation utility. With this in mind, by computing the difference between
(1.6) and (1.3), we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 2.5 (Participation constraint). An admissible normalised con-
tract pq, t0q satisfies the participation constraint of the Agent of type ε if and
only if t0 ď tmaxpε, qq, where tmax is defined for any pε, qq P r0, 1s ˆ R` by:
tmaxpε, qq :“ 1´
$&% p1` qαq´βε if q ă 1,q´βε α1`α p1` αq´βε if q ě 1. (2.6)
Therefore, w0tmaxpε, qq is the maximum price the Agent is willing to pay
for a quantity emin “ αqωw0{pe: as soon as the premium T associated to a
quantity emin “ αqωw0{pe is below w0tmaxpε, qq, an Agent of type ε is willing
to purchase the insurance contract. We say in this case that the admissible
5If the agent could resell part of the quantity, the insurance would be strictly equivalent
to an income insurance, which is why we ignore any reselling possibility.
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contract pemin, T q satisfies the participation constraint for ε types. One can
remark that, for a given normalised quantity q, this maximum price increases
with the type ε of the Agents, i.e. the probability of income loss. Therefore,
the riskier the agent, the more willing he is to pay a high price for the same
quantity insured.
2.2 Solving the Principal’s problem
As detailed in Subsection 1.3, the problem of the Principal in the First–
Best case is defined by (1.7), under the participation constraint of the Agent.
Thanks to the reasoning developed in the previous subsection, and denoting
by Ξε :“ tpq, t0q P R2`, s.t. t0 ď tmaxpε, qqu, her problem is equivalent to:
piε :“ w0 sup
pq,t0qPΞε
`
t0 ´ εαqω
˘
. (2.7)
Proposition 2.6. If β ą ω, the optimal contract pemin, T q for an Agent of
type ε P r0, 1s is given by eFBmin :“ αqεωw0{pe and T FB :“ w0tmaxpε, qεq where
qε :“
$’’’&’’’%
´
βp1` αq´βε´1{ω
¯p1`αq{p1`α`αβεq
if ε ď εFB1 ,
1
α
´`
β{ω˘1{p1`βεq ´ 1¯ if ε ą εFB1 ,
(2.8)
for εFB1 :“ 1β
ˆ
lnpβq ´ lnpωq
lnp1` αq ´ 1
˙
.
The previous result solves the Principal’s optimisation problem in the
First–Best case, its proofs is reported to Appendix B.1. The assumption β ą ω
is made to simplify the result and makes perfect sense in this framework (see
Remark B.2). Given this optimal normalised contract pqε, tmaxpε, qεqq, the
maximum profit obtained by the Principal for each type ε of Agents is com-
puted explicitly in Corollary B.1. One can notice that the quantity chosen
by an Agent does not depend on his expected revenue at time t “ 1 but is
decreasing with only the lower income level ω.
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2.3 First–Best insurance against fuel poverty
With the motivation described in Subsection 1.4, we apply the results of the
First–Best case in the context of an insurance against fuel poverty in France.
Many French households that belong to the lower class of the poorer 30% are
in fuel poverty. Indeed, in 2018, in mainland France, 78% of households in the
first income decile are in fuel poverty. This percentage falls to 54% (respec-
tively 26%) for the 2nd (respectively 3rd) income decile. These households
are already struggling to have the necessary energy to avoid fuel poverty, and
obviously do not have the financial means to subscribe to an insurance against
fuel poverty.
Therefore, to perform our numerical simulations, we consider a middle–
class household, whose annual disposable income, after taxes and social bene-
fits, is w0 “ 35, 000 e. We assume that this household lives in an all–electric
house (electric heating and hot water), with an annual electricity consump-
tion6 of e∅0 “ 14, 403 kWh. Since in 2018, in France, the average price pe per
kilowatt hour was 0.18 e, the share of household income spent on household
energy expenditure was 7.41%. We deduce from the expression of e∅0 the value
α “ 8%. Moreover, we set ω “ 0.4: the household thus has a probability ε to
have an annual disposable income equal to 0.4ˆ35, 000 e “ 14, 000 e at time
t “ 1. To simplify, we assume β “ 1.
Thanks to Proposition 2.6, we can compute the optimal quantity insured
and insurance premium, as well as the Principal’s profit (blue curves on Figure
1). In this case, a risky Agent will pay a higher insurance premium for a
smaller quantity insured than a less risky one, as we can see combining the
two upper graphs of Figure 1. More precisely, the insured quantity varies from
approximately eFBmin “ 14, 403 to 12, 653 kWh, while the price, T FB increases
from 0 to 4, 252 e. Moreover, the middle graph of Figure 1 shows that the
riskier the agent, the greater the difference between the insurance premium and
the actuarial price. Since the actuarial price also corresponds to the cost of
6Note that this consumption is approximately the average electricity consumption of a
french household, which is equal to 14, 527 kWh according to Belaïd [2016].
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Figure 1: Optimal insurance in the First–Best case.
The blue curves represents, from top to bottom, the quantity insured, the insurance
premium and the Principal’s profit, with respect to the type ε of the Agent. On the
middle graph, the insurance price is compared to the future price of the quantity (orange
curve) and to its actuarial price (green curve), which also correspond to the Principal’s
cost. The red dotted line on the bottom graph is her average profit.
the Principal, the greater the difference is, the greater her profit is. Therefore,
from the Principal’s point of view, the more efficient Agents are those who are
ready to pay more than the actuarial price (bottom graph of Figure 1). Her
average profit ΠFB “ 1, 035 e is given by the integral of her profit per Agent,
assuming that the distribution of type is uniform.
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Therefore, in our framework, the efficient Agents are those who are at risk
of losing their income, which may seem counter–intuitive. Nevertheless, this
result can be explained by the reservation utility we have chosen. More pre-
cisely, one can compute the information rent, which is the difference between
EUpε, q, t0q and EU∅pεq for an Agent of type ε. This information rent increases
with ε for every q and t0, which means exactly that the riskier the agent, the
more interesting it is for him to buy the insurance. In the First–Best case, the
Principal knows the Agent’s type and can thus reduce to zero his information
rent. This explain why a risky Agent is ready to pay more for less quantity.
The intuition for the Third–Best case, i.e. when the Principal cannot
differentiate the Agents by their type since they are unknown to her, is the
following: if she offers the optimal First–Best contract, an Agent with a pos-
itive probability of losing income should lie and pretend to be less risky, in
order to pay less for a higher quantity insured. Only non–risky Agents will
have no interest in pretending they are more risky, since they will pay more for
less quantity. As classical in adverse selection problems, the efficient Agents,
which are those who have interest in lying, will receive an information rent,
generated by the informational advantage they have over the Principal.
However, one can already notice one limit of our model: Agents with type
ε ě 0.53 (red dotted curve, middle graph) are even ready to pay more than
the future price of the quantity, i.e. peeminpεq. This fact highlights a signif-
icant inconsistency of these Agents, who are willing to pay a high price for
an insurance when it would be more efficient for them to save money instead.
One way to address this inconsistency would be to offer another option in
parallel with the insurance, such as a prepayment option (see Appendix C).
Indeed, if insurance represents their only option, the Principal abuses from
her monopoly position. In our opinion, this result already highlights the im-
portance of regulating this type of market. If the State’s interest is to fight
against fuel poverty, insurance seems to be a good option, but at the same
time alternative solutions must also be developed.
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3 Third–Best case: under adverse selection
In this section, we focus on finding the optimal menu of contracts for the
insurance in the presence of adverse selection. As explained in Subsection 2.3,
the intuition is that the First–Best contract given by Proposition 2.6 is no
longer optimal if the Principal cannot observe the Agents’ type. Indeed, with
this contract, an Agent with a positive probability of losing income should lie
and pretend to be a less risky agent in order to pay less for a higher quantity
insured. Therefore, the risky Agents should receive an information rent, gener-
ated by the informational advantage they have over the Principal. Conversely,
the Agent with the smaller type considered should have no information rent
since he has no interest in lying: if he pretends he is more risky, he will pay a
larger premium for less quantity insured.
Following this reasoning, the Principal has to find a new optimal menu of
contracts. The classical scheme to find it in this case is to use the Revelation
Principle: the Principal has to design a menu of contracts indexed by ε, such
that the Agent of type ε will choose the contract designed for him. As classical
in adverse selection problems, the more efficient Agents, i.e. Agents with high
type in our framework, will receive an information rent, generated by the
informational advantage they have over the Principal. Moreover, the Agent
with the higher risk will be insured for the optimal quantity computed in the
First–Best case. On the contrary, there will be a distortion on the optimal
quantity for other types (ε ă 1): they will be insured for a smaller quantity
than in the First–Best case.
The Revelation Principle detailed in Subsection 3.1 allows us to write the
premium of the insurance as a function of the quantity insured and the type,
to within a constant cq. In fact, the value of this constant will be related in
Subsection 3.2 to the participation constraint of the Agents: the Principal can
choose the constant depending on the Agents’ type she wants to select. Sub-
section 3.3 will be dedicated to solve the Principal’s problem, and Subsection
3.4 deals with the application to fuel poverty.
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3.1 Revelation Principle
Traditionally in adverse selection models (see Salanié [2005] for the general
theory on adverse selection), the contract offered by the Principal has to satisfy
the incentive compatible (IC) constraint: the contract has to be such that an
Agent of type ε should subscribe the contract corresponding to him, and thus
reveal his type ε, previously unknown to the Principal. Indeed, the well–known
revelation principle implies that we can restrict the study to incentive com-
patible mechanisms. More precisely, the revelation principle stated in Salanié
[2005] can be adapted to our framework as follows: If the optimal quantity emin
chosen by an Agent of type ε can be implemented through some mechanism,
then it can also be implemented through a direct and truthful mechanism where
the Agent reveals his information ε.
First, we can show that the Spence–Mirrlees condition, also called the
constant sign assumption in Guesnerie and Laffont [1984], as defined in Laffont
and Martimort [2009] is automatically satisfied in our framework (see Lemma
B.3). This property makes the incentive problem well behaved in the sense
that only local incentive constraints need to be considered. This condition was
introduced by Spence [1973] in his theory of signaling on the labour market,
and similarly by Mirrlees [1971] in his theory of optimal income taxation, as
the single–crossing assumption: it indeed implies that the indifference curves
of two different types of Agents can only cross once. This condition also has
an economic content, it implies in our framework that Agents with a higher
probability of income loss are willing to pay more for a given increase in emin
than the less risky Agents. This condition ensures that it should be possible
to separate the high risks from the low risks by offering them a better coverage
in return for a higher premium.
In order to find revealing contracts, we define, for an admissible menu of
contracts pemin, T q, an associated pair pq, t0q of functions of ε P r0, 1s.
Definition 3.1. A mechanism pq, t0q is said to be admissible if
piq q and t0 are continuous functions on r0, 1s taking values in an interval
respectively contained in R` and r0, 1q;
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piiq q and t0 have continuous first and second derivatives on p0, 1q except at
ε1 :“ mint P r0, 1s, s.t. qpq “ 1u7.
More precisely, an admissible menu of contracts pemin, T q is associated to an
admissible mechanism pq, t0q if for all quantities emin available with price T ,
there is an ε P r0, 1s such that emin “ αqpεqωw0{pe and T “ w0t0pεq.
The first point of the previous definition is entirely based on assumptions
made about an admissible menu of contracts in Definition 1.3. The second
point on the regularity of q and t0 is more a technical assumption made to
simplify the reasoning: it allows us to use the First and Second Order Con-
ditions to define an incentive compatible contract. Unfortunately, the cases
separation between q ă 1 and q ě 1 will subsequently imply a loss of C1
continuity of the quantity and price at this point.
We thus limit our study to mechanisms smooth enough in the sense of Defi-
nition 3.1 piiq. According to the reasoning of Guesnerie and Laffont [1984], our
results could be easily extend to piecewise continuously differentiable mecha-
nisms of class C1, and even some could be generalised to all mechanisms. Nev-
ertheless, significant additional difficulties can be avoided with this smooth-
ness assumption. Moreover, one can notice that the optimal mechanism in the
First–Best case is smooth in the sense of Definition 3.1 piiq, and it therefore
makes sense to restrict our study in this way.
The IC constraint says that the utility of an Agent of type ε P r0, 1s has to
be maximal for the choice of the contract pqpεq, t0pεqq, i.e.
EUQ
`
ε, qpεq, t0pεq
˘ “ max
ε1Pr0,1s
EUQ
`
ε, qpε1q, t0pε1q
˘
.
In other words, if a menu of contracts satisfies the IC constraint, then the
Agent has an interest in revealing his type by choosing the contract made
for him. We denote by CQ the set of admissible mechanism satisfying this
constraint. With the aim of lightening the equations, we denote throughout
7With the convention that ε1 “ 0 if qpq ě 1 for all  P r0, 1s.
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this section:
Q0pεq :“
$’’’&’’’%
ż ε
0
ln
`
1` αqpq˘d if ε P r0, ε1qż ε1
0
ln
`
1` αqpq˘d` α1` α
ż ε
ε1
ln
`
qpq˘d if ε P rε1, 1s. (3.1)
Theorem 3.2. An admissible mechanism pq, t0q satisfies the IC constraint for
all ε P r0, 1s if and only if the function q is non–decreasing on r0, 1s and there
exists cq ě 0 such that the price t0 satisfies for all ε P r0, 1s,
t0pεq “ 1´ cqeβQ0pεq ˆ
$’&’%
`
1` αqpεq˘´βε if ε P r0, ε1q,`
1` α˘´βε1`qpεq˘´βεα{p1`αq if ε P rε1, 1s. (3.2)
The previous proposition provides a characterisation of an admissible mech-
anism pq, t0q satisfying the IC constraint for all type of Agents, its proof is
postponed to Appendix B.2. Nevertheless, the concrete menu of contracts
proposed by the Principal must be composed of quantities emin and a price T
associated with each quantity, regardless of the type of Agent, as specified in
Definition 1.3. The form of the practical menu of contracts associated to an
admissible mechanism is a consequence of the previous theorem and is given
by Corollary B.5. We can summarise this result by saying that considering a
sufficiently smooth admissible menu of revealing contracts pemin, T q is equiva-
lent to considering an admissible mechanism pq, t0q, where q is non–decreasing
and the price t0 is given by (3.2). It is now necessary to establish conditions
implying that such a mechanism satisfies the Agent’s participation constraint.
3.2 Adding the participation constraint
Recall that an Agent of type ε P r0, 1s will accept the contract if his utility
with it is bigger than his reservation utility, defined in our framework as his
utility without insurance. To establish a precise result, we define the function
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c for all ε P r0, 1s by:
cpεq :“
$&%e´βQ0pεq if ε ă ε1,p1` αq´βpε´ε1qe´βQ0pεq if ε ě ε1. (3.3)
The following proposition states that by controlling the constant cq in the
insurance premium t0 given by (3.2), the Principal can choose to select or
not Agents with smaller types. As a result, only the most risky Agents will
be selected by the Principal. Indeed, the Agents with a high probability of
losing their income are easily satisfied and willing to pay much more than the
less risky ones. This result is entirely implied by the fact that the reservation
utility of an Agent depends on his type, and only happens in Principal–Agent
problems with countervailing incentives. Additional information including the
proof of the proposition can be found in Appendix B.3. In particular, Remark
B.6 shows that if a constant reservation utility had been chosen, the selected
Agents would have been the less risky.
Proposition 3.3. If the mechanism pq, t0q is admissible and incentive com-
patible, an Agent of type ε P r0, 1s subscribes to the insurance if and only if
cq ě cpεq. Moreover, by defining ε :“ mintε P r0, 1s, s.t. cq “ cpεqu, the
participation constraint is satisfied only for Agents of type ε P rε, 1s.
Now that the set of the menu of revealing contracts satisfying the Agents’
participation constraint is well–defined, we can study the Principal’s problem.
3.3 The optimal menu of contracts
In the Third–Best case, the Principal’s goal is to find an optimal admissible
menu of contracts pemin, T q, in order to maximise her profit, as defined by
(1.8), without knowing the Agent’s type. In fact, instead of maximising the
utility of the Principal’s over all possible contracts, we restrict the study to
menu of contracts associated to an admissible mechanism pq, t0q in the sense
of Definition 3.1. Then, by the revelation principle, it is sufficient to only
consider admissible mechanisms that are revealing. Recalling that an Agent
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will subscribe a contract if and only if it satisfies his participation constraint,
the Principal’s problem becomes:
sup
pq,t0qPCQ
ż
εPΞpq,t0q
pipεqdε, for pipεq :“ w0t0pεq ´ εαqpεqωw0, (3.4)
where Ξpq, t0q denotes the set of ε P r0, 1s such that the participation constraint
t0pεq ď tmaxpε, qpεqq is satisfied, where tmax is defined by (2.6).
By Theorem 3.2, we know that an admissible mechanism pq, t0q satisfies
the IC constraint if and only if q is increasing and the price t0 is given by
(3.2). Moreover, we know by Proposition 3.3 that the participation constraint
is satisfied only for Agents of type ε P rε, 1s if and only if cq “ cpεq, where c is
defined by (3.3). For ε P r0, 1s, we thus denote by CQpεq the set of admissible
and revealing mechanisms such that the participation constraint is satisfied for
all ε P rε, 1s only. Following the previous reasoning, the Principal’s problem is
equivalent to:
sup
εPr0,1s
Πpεq, where Πpεq :“ sup
pq,t0qPCQpεq
ż 1
ε
pipεqdε.
To solve the Principal’s problem, we first fix ε P r0, 1s. We denote by Qpεq
the space of functions Q defined on rε, 1s, continuous and piecewise continu-
ously differentiable of class C3, satisfying:
piq Q is continuous on rε, 1s and such that Qpεq “ 0;
piiq Q1 is positive and continuous except at ε1, where Q1pε1´ q “ lnp1`αq and
Q1pε1` q “ 0;
piiiq Q2 is positive and continuous except at ε1.
We consider the following second–order non–linear ordinary differential equa-
tion (ODE):
β
ω
`
βε2Q2pεq ´ 2˘eβpQpεq´εQ1pεqq `Gpε,Qq “ 0, (3.5)
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with initial conditions Qpεq “ 0 and Q1pεq “ q, for q P R`, and where the
function G is defined for any pε,Qq P rε, 1s ˆQpεq by:
Gpε,Qq :“
$’’&’’%
`
1` εQ2pεq˘eQ1pεq, for ε P rε, ε1 _ εq,`
1` α˘βpε1_εq`1ˆ1` ε1` α
α
Q2pεq
˙
e 1`αα Q1pεq, for ε P rε1 _ ε, 1s.
This ODE is at the heart of the resolution of the Principal’s problem, since it
characterises the optimal admissible mechanism, for ε and q fixed.
Theorem 3.4. Given ε P r0, 1s and q P R`, if there exists Q P Qpεq solution to
the ODE (3.5), then the optimal admissible mechanism pq, t0q for the Principal
is given by:
ˆ
1
α
`
eQ1pεq ´ 1˘, 1´ eβpQpεq´εQ1pεqq˙ for ε P rε, ε1 _ εqˆ
e 1`αα Q1pεq, 1´ `1` α˘´βpε1_εqeβpQpεq´εQ1pεqq˙ for ε P rε1 _ ε, 1s.
Remark 3.5. Theorem 3.4 only gives a sufficient condition for the Principal’s
optimisation problem. In fact, it would be possible to obtain a necessary condi-
tion. Nevertheless, in the numerical example we are interested in pdetailed in
the following subsectionq, as the solution of the ODE (3.5) naturally satisfies
the constraint of being in Qpεq, we decide to simplify the result by presenting
it in this way. For more details, the reader is referred to Remark B.8.
For the sake of clarity, the proof of the theorem is reported in Appendix B.4.
However, the ODE (3.5) cannot be solved other than numerically. Therefore,
to solve the Principal’s problem, one have to first fix ε P r0, 1s and an arbitrary
initial value q P R` for Q1pεq. Then, the solution of the previous ODE can be
computed. With this solution, one can compute the Principal’s profit in this
case, using Corollary B.7. This profit can then be maximised by choosing an
optimal initial condition q and an optimal ε P r0, 1s. For the numerical results,
readers are referred to the next subsection, which discusses the application of
this model to a particular framework: the fuel poverty.
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3.4 Third–Best insurance against fuel poverty
We consider the same household as the one studied in Subsection 2.3.
By the recursive scheme explained in the previous subsection, we obtain the
optimal ε‹ « 0.63 with Q1pε‹q « 0, and thus, Agents of type ε ă 0.63 are not
insured. Solving the ODE (3.5) for these parameters, we obtain the optimal
function Q P Qpε‹, 0q, and in particular ε‹1 » 0.66. Thanks to Theorem
3.4, we can compute the optimal admissible revealing mechanism pq‹, t‹0q, and
thus the optimal quantity insured for an Agent of type ε P rε‹, 1s which is
e‹minpεq “ αq‹pεqωw0{pe, and its corresponding price T ‹pεq “ w0t‹0pεq. The
optimal quantities and prices are represented by blue curves in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Optimal insurance contract in the Third–Best case.
On the left graph: the optimal quantity insured (blue) is compared to the quantity of the
First–Best case (green). On the right graph: the optimal premium (blue) is compared to
the maximum price (green) and to the future price (orange). Dotted black axes: ε “ ε1.
The left graph shows that the quantity insured in the Third–Best case
(blue curve) is smaller than the one in the First–Best case (green curve). Only
Agents of type ε “ 1 will be insured for the same quantity of the First–Best
case, modulo numerical errors, i.e. e‹minp1q « 12, 665 kWh/year. On the right
graph, the green curve represents the maximum price an Agent of type ε will
be ready to pay for the quantity e‹minpεq, given by Tmaxpεq :“ w0tmaxpε, q‹pεqq.
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We thus observe that, as stated before, an Agent of type ε‹ pay his maximum
price, and his information rent is thus reduced to zero. On the contrary, an
Agent of type ε ą ε‹ obtain an information rent. In particular, the information
rent is increasing with ε. Finally, as already noticed in the First–Best case,
the insurance premium is higher than the future price of the quantity, pee‹min
(orange curve). This result highlights a form of inconsistency of the Agents
and reflects the need to put in place, in addition to the insurance, other options
to encourage the risky Agents to save.
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Figure 3: Principal’s profit in the Third–Best case.
Blue curve: profit per type. Dotted red curve: expected profit. Dotted black axis: ε “ ε1.
Given the optimal admissible revealing mechanism pq‹, t‹0q, we can compute
the profit pi‹ of the Principal for every type of Agents, represented in Figure
3. In particular, her total profit Π‹ on the considered population, given by
the integral of pi‹pεq between ε‹ and 1, is equal to 351 e. To show the benefit
of considering a menu of contracts, we can compare our results to the profit
induced by a unique contract. In this case, the optimal quantity and price can
easily be computed, theoretically and numerically: emin « 10, 538 kWh/year
and T « 2, 549 e. This contract induces an average profit of 342 e for the
Principal, and only Agents with type ε ě 0.65 subscribe to the insurance.
Therefore, there is a positive gain for the Principal in implementing a menu of
contracts instead of a unique contract. More precisely, it represents an average
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gain of 2.7% on each contract offered. Moreover, with a menu of contracts,
more Agents are insured, since ε‹ ă 0.65.
Given the menu of contracts pe‹min, T ‹q associated to the optimal admissible
revealing mechanism pq‹, t‹0q, we can compute the optimal consumption of the
Agents who subscribe to the insurance (see Lemmas 2.1, A.1 and A.2 for the
formulas). The left graph of Figure 4 represents the optimal consumption of
energy at time t “ 0, eQ0 with insurance (blue curve) and e∅0 without (orange
curve). Obviously, with insurance, an Agent will consume less than without
insurance, since paying the insurance decreases his effective income to be split
between the two goods. At time t “ 1, if the Agent does not suffer from a
loss of income, the insurance is not activated and he will thus consume the
same quantity of energy in both cases, with and without insurance. On the
contrary, as we can see in Figure 4 (right graph), if he suffers from a loss of
income, he will consume more energy with insurance (blue curve) than without
(orange curve). More precisely, without insurance, his optimal consumption is
e∅1 « 5, 800 KWh, which is around the level of consumption of an household
of four people without electric heating. Therefore, one can consider that the
household renounces heating its house, for example, because of its loss of
income. Otherwise, if the Agent of type ε is insured, he will receive the quantity
e‹minpεq. By Lemma A.2, we can then compute his optimal consumption eQ1 pεq
of energy. His effective consumption eeff1 pεq (blue curve) is given by the sum
of eQ1 pεq and e‹minpεq. It is interesting to note that the more risky the Agent
is, the higher the insured quantity is, and it tends towards the quantity e∅0
consumed with the initial income w0.
By definition of ε1, an Agent of type ε P rε‹, ε1q receives a quantity
e‹minpεq ă semin. In this case, the insurance acts as an earmarked fund, or
a liquid asset: the Agent behaves exactly as if his income had been increased
by pee‹minpεq. More precisely, a part α{p1`αq of this supplementary income is
dedicated to electricity consumption, and the other part, 1{p1`αq, is dedicated
to the other good, in the same way that his income wt at time t is distributed
between the two goods. Actually, since the insurance is an in–kind support,
the Agent has to decrease his consumption eQ1 and increases his consumption
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yQ1 , in order to perfectly split this fictive supplementary income between the
two goods. On the contrary, when the insured quantity is higher, precisely if
e‹minpεq ą semin, the Agent’s consumption eQ1 is reduced to 0, and he cannot
decrease it anymore. In this case, his effective consumption is given by e‹minpεq,
and the Agent cannot properly split this fictive supplementary income between
the two goods. For these types of Agents, i.e. ε ě ε1, the insurance no longer
acts as a liquid asset, thus ensuring a higher electricity consumption.
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Figure 4: Energy consumption in the Third–Best case.
Consumption with the insurance (blue) and without (orange), at time t “ 0 on the left,
and at time t “ 1 in the case of an income loss on the right. Dotted black axes: ε “ ε1.
The previous result is very interesting in the situation we considered. In-
deed, a household that falls into fuel poverty due to a loss of income will tend
to consume less electricity, which can lead to health problems and housing
damage. This is exactly the kind of problems we want to avoid by propos-
ing an insurance. Nevertheless, a traditional income insurance will allow the
agent to receive money in the event of loss of income. However, an Agent in
fuel poverty has other needs to satisfy that he considers more important. He
would therefore use the insurance money largely for these expenses, ignoring
the significance for his health of heating his home sufficiently, for example8.
8Considering our model for the Agent’s consumption, it can be shown that an income
insurance will be less efficient than the insurance with benefits in kind we developed.
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The insurance we model prevents this bias, it somehow constrains the Agent
to consume enough electricity to live decently in his home.
4 Conclusion
We develop a two–period Principal–Agent problem with adverse selection
and endogenous reservation utility to model an insurance with benefits in kind.
This model allows us to obtain semi–explicit solutions. Applied to the energy
sector, this in–kind support helps to prevent fuel poverty among households.
Indeed, when a household suffers from a loss of income, if it has subscribed to
the insurance we propose, it will consume more energy than without insurance.
In this application, providing support in kind therefore forces the household to
consume more energy, and thus avoids risky behaviour that can lead to serious
health problems. The insurance thus makes it possible to cover Agents’ risks
of fuel poverty, but also to pool costs between the risky Agents.
Following the same approach as developed in this paper, it can be shown
that the conclusions on consumption would not be the same in the case of an
income insurance, the household would not increase its energy consumption
sufficiently. The insurance we propose is also different from those provided
by the two French energy suppliers EDF and ENGIE: these insurances offer a
reimbursement of part of electricity consumption, which means the household
has to pay its bill first. However, if it suffers a loss of income, the household
will tend to reduce its consumption for fear of not being able to pay its bill,
even if it is reimbursed afterwards. An in–kind support helps to avoid this
bias. Moreover, our model can be extended to random prices, which would
allow the insured to have a guaranteed quantity even in case of a price increase.
The simplicity of our model makes it easy to extend it to a multi–period
model, keeping in mind that only Agents who are not in precarious situations
are entitled to subscribe to the insurance. Thus, an Agent who has not suffered
from a loss of income can pay again the premium to reinsure himself for the
next period. A simple repetition of the model is sufficient to deal with this
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case. Moreover, we have chosen to apply it for an insurance against fuel
poverty. Nevertheless, this type of model could be used for another staple,
whose consumption is affected by the loss of income. More generally, this type
of insurance could also be purchased by production firms to ensure that they
have sufficient input in the event of a temporary downturn in revenues.
Developing such insurance could therefore make it possible to prevent
households from fuel poverty for example, and thus avoid significant soci-
etal costs. The effects of fuel poverty on the physical and mental health of
individuals are not questionable (see Lacroix and Chaton [2015]): to keep heat
inside their homes, some households obstruct vents, thus generating moisture
and mould, that can cause respiratory problems such as chronic asthma or
rhinitis. Moreover, households in fuel poverty are often forced to make choices
with harmful consequences for their health: eating or heating, giving up care
or giving up going out. However, the societal cost of fuel poverty is difficult
to quantify, and this is why it is not taken into account in our model. A
possible extension could therefore be to consider the State’s problem, who is
faced with the costs of fuel poverty, and try to encourage insurers to offer this
type of insurance, or to persuade households to subscribe to it. Consideration
could also be given to making this type of insurance mandatory, either by law
or by a contract between a landlord and a tenant for example. Indeed, on
the one hand, the State could have an interest in ensuring that the Agent is
not in fuel poverty in order to reduce health expenses. On the other hand, a
landlord, or even a social landlord, could have the same interest in order to
avoid deterioration by the tenant of the housing he owns.
However, before developing extensions to this model, it would be necessary
to address the issue of high price. Indeed, since the households considered do
not think about saving to have a sufficient quantity of essential goods regardless
of their future income, their choice are limited to subscribing to the insurance
or doing nothing. Due to the form of the utility chosen, in particular its
concavity, Agents who anticipate a loss of income with a high probability are
willing to pay a very high price for the insurance we offer. Indeed, they prefer
to significantly reduce their disposable income by subscribing to the insurance,
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which only slightly reduces their utility, to ensure sufficient consumption the
following year, which significantly increase their utility. This results in a very
high insurance price, higher than the future price of the quantity subscribed.
Therefore, insurance can be a tool to protect at–risk households, but it cannot
be set up alone if the welfare of the Agents is desired. Indeed, even if our
model shows a gain in utility for the Agents subscribing to the insurance, this
can be explained by the lack of option for the Agent.
Some suggestions could be considered to make the insurance premium more
realistic. First of all, if a regulator required the insurance to be offered to all
types of Agents, i.e. ε “ 0, the insurance price would be lower. In addition,
the regulator could also better control the monopoly position of electricity
suppliers in the case of energy insurance. By introducing competition in the
market for this type of insurance, the price should fall towards the marginal
cost of insurance. Another solution that seems, in our opinion, easy to imple-
ment, would be to increase the possibilities of the Agents by offering them an
additional option: the prepayment. This option can be a way to encourage
high–risk Agents to save money, because he does not voluntarily.
The model with prepayment is described in Appendix C.1. In fact, adding
this option only changes the participation constraint of the Agent: if the
Agent’s utility with prepayment is higher than with insurance, he will not
subscribe to the insurance. In this situation, we can see in Appendix C.2
that, even in the case of First–Best, this option allows a large decrease in the
price of the insurance. Unfortunately, this addition implies that the Third–
Best case detailed in Appendix C.3 is more complicated to solve, although the
techniques developed throughout this paper are a step towards resolution. In
our opinion, this case would require further study, since it appears to be a very
good way to lower the insurance premium and to insure medium–risk Agents.
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A Optimal consumption with insurance
For a better readability, this appendix regroups the results obtained on optimal consumptions
in each good and at each period of time, with insurance. These results are not at the heart of
our study, but they represent necessary steps to establish Proposition 2.3 that define the expected
utility of an Agent with insurance. Moreover, results on optimal consumption in each case is used
in numerical simulation to compare the effect of the insurance on consumption.
Lemma A.1 (With insurance, at time 0). Given an insurance premium T , the optimal Agent’s
consumptions in each good at time t “ 0 are given by
yQ0 :“ 11` α
w0 ´ T
py
and eQ0 :“ α1` α
w0 ´ T
pe
;
and his corresponding maximum utility is V0pT q “ p1` αq lnpw0 ´ T q ` Cα,pe,py .
Without loss of generality, we can assume that T is of the form T :“ t0w0 for t0 P r0, 1q.
Therefore, by slightly abusing the notations as in Lemma 2.1, we denote by V0pt0q the maximum
utility the Agent can achieve by optimally choosing his consumption, which can be written as:
V0pt0q “ p1` αq lnpw0q ` p1` αq ln
`
1´ t0
˘` Cα,pe,py . (A.1)
The Agent thus pays a price w0t0 at time t “ 0, depending on the amount of staple good emin he
wants to receive at time t “ 1. By setting the quantity semin :“ αωw0{pe, we obtain the following
result on optimal consumption at time t “ 1.
Lemma A.2 (With insurance, at time 1). Given an insurance contract pemin, T q, the optimal
Agent’s consumptions in each good at time t “ 1 are given by
eQ1 :“
ˆ
α
1` α
ωw0
pe
´ 11` αemin1ω“ω
˙`
and yQ1 :“ ωw0 ´ pee
Q
1
py
,
where x` :“ maxtx, 0u for all x P R, and provide the following maximum utility to the Agent:
V1pωw0, eminq “
#
p1` αq lnpωw0 ` peemin1ω“ωq ` Cα,pe,py if emin1ω“ω ă semin,
lnpωw0q ` α lnpeminq ´ lnppyq if emin1ω“ω ě semin.
The case separation in the previous proposition is needed to ensure that the consumption eQ1
at time t “ 1 is non–negative. Indeed, the consumer should not be allowed to sell back the staple
good. In the first case, i.e. when emin1ω“ω ă semin, the Agent’s utility at time t “ 1 depends only
on his effective income ωw0 ` peemin1ω“ω. Assuming that the choice of emin is restricted to the
interval r0, semins is equivalent to assuming that the quantity offered is smaller than the optimal
quantity consumed in the event of an income loss. Therefore, in this case, the insurance acts as
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an earmarked fund, or a liquid asset: the Agent would have spent at least the quantity emin, so he
reacts as if his income is increased by this value. On the contrary, in the second case, the Agent
will consume only the amount emin of staple good, the optimal eQ1 becoming equal to zero. In this
case, the insurance is not interpreted as a liquid asset, the Agent consumes all the quantity emin
offered to him, leading to a utility α lnpeminq, and does not consider it as an increase in income.
He then spend all his income ωw0 in the other good.
To simplify the notations, we can assume without loss of generality that emin is of the form
emin “ qαωw0{pe for some q P R`. The maximum utility obtained by the Agent at time t “ 1 can
thus be written as a function of ω and q as follows:
V1pω, qq “ p1` αq lnpωw0q ` sUpqq1ω“ω ` Cα,pe,py , (A.2)
where sU is defined by (2.4). Combining (A.1) and (A.2), we can compute explicitly the expected
utility of an Agent subscribing to an insurance contract, which allows to state Proposition 2.3.
Then, comparing the utility with and without insurance, we can determine when an Agent of type
ε will subscribe to the insurance (see Proposition 2.5). The Agent will thus subscribe the insurance
as soon as the premium is below a specific level, given by (2.6). Given the form of the maximum
price, it can already be noticed that some Agents show a certain form of irrationality, due to their
unwillingness to save money from one period to the next.
Remark A.3 (Maximum price without uncertainty). One can notice that, in our framework, the
maximal price the consumer is willing to pay in the case without uncertainty is not equal to the
actuarial price peemin. Indeed, assuming that q ă 1 and setting β “ 1 for simplicity, we obtain
w0tmaxp1, qq ą peemin as soon as w0 ą ωw0 ` peemin. Therefore, if the income of the consumer at
time t “ 0 is larger than the effective money he will have at time t “ 1 with the insurance, he is
willing to pay a certain amount of money at time t “ 0 to obtain less at time t “ 1. Conversely,
if his income w0 is lower than the money he will have at time t “ 1, he will not be prone to pay
the real price of the energy he will get. This result is a little bit counter intuitive, but is totally
explained by the choice of concave utilities in a two–period model and the absence of saving. This
problem does not occur in single period models. However, a one–period model would not allow to
model a household willing to insure against a possible loss of future income. One solution could
be to offer the Agent the opportunity to have savings, but this is not consistent with the type of
household being considered. Therefore, an alternative approach to address this issue is initiated in
Appendix C.
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B Technical results and proofs...
B.1 ... for the First–Best Case
The profit of the Principal in the First–Best case, induced by the optimal contract detailed in
Proposition 2.6, is given by the following result.
Corollary B.1. Let us assume β ą ω. The optimal contract peFBmin, T FBq for an Agent of type
ε P r0, 1s induced the following profit for the Principal:
piFBε :“
$’’&’’%
w0
´
1´ `βp1` αq{ω˘´βε{p1`α`αβεq ´ εω`βp1` αq´βε{ω˘p1`αq{p1`α`αβεq¯ if ε ď εFB1 ,
w0
´
1` εω ´ `β{ω˘´βε{p1`βεq ´ εω`β{ω˘1{p1`βεq¯ if ε ą εFB1 .
The proof of the previous corollary results from the proof of the associated proposition, detailed
below.
Proof of Proposition 2.6. We fix the Agent’s type ε P r0, 1s. Since the profit of the Principal is
increasing in T , she has interest in setting the price of the insurance equal to the maximum price
the Agent is willing to pay, i.e. t0 “ tmaxpε, qq, for q P R`. The participation constraint of the
Agent is thus binding and the maximisation problem of the Principal (2.7) becomes:
piε “ w0 max
"
sup
qPr0,1q
!
1´ p1` αqq´βε ´ εαqω
)
, sup
qě1
!
1´ q´βε α1`α p1` αq´βε ´ εαqω
)*
.
Computing the First and Second Order Conditions (FOC and SOC) for each supremum, and since
β ą ω, we obtain that the two suprema are respectively attained for q1 and q2 where:
q1 “ min
"
1
α
´`
β{ω˘1{p1`βεq ´ 1¯, 1*, and q2 “ max"´βp1` αq´βε{ω¯p1`αq{p1`α`αβεq, 1*.
If ε ą εFB1 , then q1 ă 1 and q2 “ 1, and conversely if ε ă εFB1 , then q1 “ 1 and q2 ą 1. Since the
two suprema have the same value for q “ 1, we conclude that qε defined by (2.8) is optimal.
Remark B.2. We assume in Proposition 2.6 and Corollary B.1 that β ą ω because it is the most
interesting case. Otherwise, we would have εFB1 ă 0 and the maximum would be reached for q1
defined in the previous proof. However, in this particular case, q1 is negative for all ε P r0, 1s.
Therefore, the optimal qε is zero in this case, for all ε P r0, 1s. This means that the Principal has
no interest in offering the insurance. Indeed, when β is too small, the Agent has very little concern
for his future, so he is not willing to pay for an insurance to protect him.
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B.2 ...to find a revealing menu of contracts
Before seeking for a revealing menu of contracts, we first prove that the Spence–Mirrlees con-
dition is satisfied in our framework (see Lemma B.3). This condition is important since it makes
the incentive problem well behaved in the sense that only local incentive constraints need to be
considered. Together with Lemma B.4, this allows us to establish Theorem 3.2, whose proof is
reported below, after the two lemmas.
Lemma B.3. The marginal rates of substitution between the in–kind support and the insurance
price can be ranked in a monotonic way. More precisely,
B
Bε
˜
BqEUQ
`
ε, q, t0
˘
Bt0EUQ
`
ε, q, t0
˘¸ ď 0.
Proof. Indeed, recalling that the expected utility of an Agent of type ε is given by (2.5), we have:
BqEUQ
`
ε, q, t0
˘ “ # βεαp1` αq{p1` qαq if q ă 1,
βεα{q if q ě 1, and Bt0EU
Q
`
ε, q, t0
˘ “ ´ 1` α1´ t0 ,
which leads to
B
Bε
˜
BqEUQ
`
ε, q, t0
˘
Bt0EUQ
`
ε, q, t0
˘¸ “
$’’&’’%
´βαp1´ t0q1` qα if q ă 1,
´βαp1´ t0q
qp1` αq if q ě 1.
Both quotients are indeed non–positive since the price of the insurance should be at least smaller
than the Agents’ income which implies t0 ă 1, and all other quantities and prices are positive.
Lemma B.4. Let pq, t0q be an admissible mechanism such that q is non–decreasing and t0 is given
by (3.2) for some cq ě 0. If the function q is constant on some interval contained in r0, 1s, then
the price t0 is also constant on this interval.
Proof. Let us first assume that q is constant on some interval rx, ys, where y ă ε1. For all ε in this
interval, we have in particular qpεq “ qpxq and thus:
t0pεq “ 1´ cq
`
1` αqpxq˘´βx´βpε´xq expˆβ ż x
0
ln
`
1` αqpq˘d` β ż ε
x
ln
`
1` αqpxq˘d˙
“ 1´ cq
`
1` αqpxq˘´βx expˆβ ż x
0
ln
`
1` αqpq˘d˙.
Therefore, for all ε P rx, ys, t0pεq “ t0pxq, i.e. t0 is constant on this interval. The proof is
highly similar for an interval rx, ys such that x ě ε1. Finally, if the interval rx, ys contains ε1, we
necessarily have qpεq “ 1 for all ε in the interval. By definition of ε1, we actually have x ě ε1, and
the problem is reduced to the previous case.
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Proof of Theorem 3.2. piq We first prove that q non–decreasing with respect to ε P r0, 1s and t0
satisfying (3.2) are necessary conditions for the admissible mechanism pq, t0q to satisfy the IC
constraint on r0, 1s. To prove this, we first fix ε P p0, 1q, such that qpεq ‰ 1, and focus the study
on an Agent of type ε. Using (2.5), his expected utility if he choses a contract pqpε1q, t0pε1qq, for
some ε1 P r0, 1s, is as follows:
EUQ
`
ε, qpε1q, t0pε1q
˘ “ EU∅pεq ` p1` αq ln `1´ t0pε1q˘` βεsU`qpε1q˘. (B.1)
The mechanism pq, t0q is incentive compatible if the Agent choses the contract designed for
him to maximise his utility. Therefore, the utility computed above must attain its maximum on
ε1 “ ε. Since the mechanism is assumed to be regular enough, we can compute the first and second
derivatives of the previous utility, with respect to ε1. The First Order Condition (FOC) says that
the first derivative has to be equal to zero for ε1 “ ε. Since the derivative with respect to ε1 P p0, 1q
of EUQpε, qpε1q, t0pε1qq is given by:
Bε1EUQ
`
ε, qpε1q, t0pε1q
˘ “ ´ p1` αq Bε1t0pε1q1´ t0pε1q ` p1` αqβεˆ
$’’’&’’’%
αBε1qpε1q
1` αqpε1q if qpε
1q ă 1,
αBε1qpε1q
p1` αqqpε1q if qpε
1q ą 1,
(B.2)
the FOC for the Agent of type ε is as follows:
Bεt0pεq “
$’’’’&’’’’%
βε
αBεqpεq
1` αqpεq
`
1´ t0pεq
˘
if qpεq ă 1,
βε
αBεqpεq
p1` αqqpεq
`
1´ t0pεq
˘
if qpεq ą 1.
(B.3)
Moreover, to check that ε1 “ ε attains a local maximum, the second order derivative has to be
negative for ε1 “ ε (Second Order Condition – SOC), which gives:
0 ě ´ B
2
εt0pεq
1´ t0pεq ´
ˆ Bεt0pεq
1´ t0pεq
˙2
` βεˆ
$’’’’’&’’’’’%
αB2εqpεq
1` αqpεq ´
α2
`Bεqpεq˘2`
1` αqpεq˘2 if qpεq ă 1,
αB2εqpεq
p1` αqqpεq ´
α
`Bεqpεq˘2
p1` αq`qpεq˘2 if qpεq ą 1.
(B.4)
The mechanism pq, t0q must be revealing for every types of Agents, which implies that the previous
FOC and SOC has to be true at least for all ε P p0, 1q such that qpεq ‰ 1.
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On the one hand, by differentiating (B.3), we prove that t0 should satisfy:
B2εt0pεq “
$’’’’’&’’’’’%
βα
`
1´ t0pεq
˘`
1` αqpεq˘2
´`Bεqpεq ` εB2εqpεq˘p1` αqpεqq ´ αε`Bεqpεq˘2p1` βεq¯ if qpεq ă 1,
βα
`
1´ t0pεq
˘
p1` αq`qpεq˘2
ˆ`Bεqpεq ` εB2εqpεq˘qpεq ´ ε`Bεqpεq˘2ˆ1` α1` αβε
˙˙
if qpεq ą 1.
Replacing the first and second derivatives of t0 by their values computed above, we obtain that
the SOC (B.4) is equivalent in both cases to Bεqpεq ě 0. Therefore, q is non–decreasing before
attaining 1, and also non–decreasing after. By continuity of the function q, it can either cross the
constant line equal to 1 only once, or be equal to 1 over an interval. In both cases, it implies that
the function q is non–decreasing on p0, 1q. We can thus denote by rε1, ε2s the interval on which q
is constant equal to 1, with the convention that this interval is reduced to tε1u if there exists only
one point where q is equal to 1, ε1 “ ε2 “ 1 if q is always strictly less than 1, and ε1 “ ε2 “ 0 if q
is always strictly greater than 1.
On the other hand, by solving (B.3) when qpεq ă 1, i.e. ε P p0, ε1q, we obtain
t0pεq “ 1´ cq
`
1` αqpεq˘´βεeβQ0pεq,
for some constant cq P R, using the notation defined in (3.1). This proves the first form in (3.2).
Moreover, solving the second part of (B.3), i.e. for ε P pε2, 1q, leads to:
t0pεq “ 1´ rcqpqpεqq´βεα{p1`αq expˆ βα1` α
ż ε
ε2
lnpqpqqd
˙
,
for some rcq P R. The two previous forms are respectively valid on r0, ε1s and rε2, 1s by the assumed
continuity of t0. If ε1 “ ε2 P p0, 1q, the price is continuous at this point if and only if
rcq “ cq`1` α˘´βε1eβQ0pε1q, (B.5)
and we thus obtain the second form in Equation (3.2). With this setting, if ε1 “ ε2 “ 0, we obtainrcq “ cq and the price is given by (3.2) for all ε P p0, 1q, to within the constant cq. The similar
reasoning applies if ε1 “ ε2 “ 1. It remains to deal with the case where q is constant on the
interval rε1, ε2s, not reduced to a singleton. To address this case, let us consider an Agent of type
ε P pε1, ε2q. For the mechanism to be revealing to him, his expected utility EUQpε, qpε1q, t0pε1qq
must at least reach a local maximum in ε1 “ ε. His utility for any ε1 P pε1, ε2q is as follows, since
q is constant equal to 1 on this interval:
EUQ
`
ε, qpε1q, t0pε1q
˘ “ EU∅pεq ` p1` αq ln `1´ t0pε1q˘` βεp1` αq ln `1` α˘.
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Therefore, ε is a maximum point on pε1, ε2q if for any ε1 on this interval, t0pεq ď t0pε1q. Conversely,
the mechanism is revealing for the Agent of type ε1 at least if t0pεq ě t0pε1q. This naturally
implies that t0 is also constant on pε1, ε2q. In particular, by continuity of the price, we should have
t0pε1q “ t0pε2q, which also implies (B.5). Finally, we obtain for all ε P rε2, 1s:
t0pεq “ 1´ cq
`
1` α˘´βε1pqpεqq´βεα{p1`αqeβQ0pε1q expˆ βα1` α
ż ε
ε2
lnpqpqqd
˙
“ 1´ cq
`
1` α˘´βε1pqpεqq´βεα{p1`αqeβQ0pεq,
where the second equality is implied by q constant equal to 1 on rε1, ε2s. Therefore, the form (3.2)
is proven to be true in any cases. Finally, since the mechanism has to be admissible in the sense
of Definition 3.1, we should have t0pεq ă 1 for all ε P r0, 1s, which implies cq ą 0. We therefore
have shown that q non–decreasing with respect to ε P r0, 1s and t0 satisfying (3.2) are necessary
conditions for the menu of contracts to satisfy the IC constraint on r0, 1s.
piiq It remains to prove that these conditions are sufficient. To this end, we recall that the
expected utility of an Agent of type ε who chooses a contract pqpε1q, t0pε1qq is given by (B.1). In
particular, its derivative with respect to ε1 for ε1 P p0, 1q such that qpε1q ‰ 1, is given by (B.2).
Since t0 satisfies (B.3) in particular in ε1, we obtain
Bε1EUQ
`
ε, qpε1q, t0pε1q
˘ “
$’’’’&’’’’%
p1` αqβαBε1qpε
1q
1` αqpε1q
`
ε´ ε1˘ if qpε1q ă 1,
β
αBε1qpε1q
qpε1q
`
ε´ ε1˘ if qpε1q ą 1.
Moreover, if we consider without loss of generality that q is constant equal to 1 on some interval
rε1, ε2s, and take ε P pε1, ε2q, then, by Lemma B.4, for any neighbourhood of ε contained in rε1, ε2s,
the price given by (3.2) is also constant. Therefore the expected utility EUQpε, qpε1q, t0pε1qq is in
fact also differentiable on this neighbourhood, and its derivative is equal to zero. In summary, the
following values are obtained for the derivative of the expected utility:
Bε1EUQ
`
ε, qpε1q, t0pε1q
˘ “
$’’’’’&’’’’’%
βp1` αq αBε1qpε
1q
1` αqpε1q
`
ε´ ε1˘ if 0 ă ε1 ă ε1,
0 if ε1 P pε1, ε2q,
βα
Bε1qpε1q
qpε1q
`
ε´ ε1˘ if ε2 ă ε1 ă 1.
We first check that the contract is revealing for the interior types of Agents, i.e. where the previous
derivative is defined. It suffices to remark that the expected utility of an Agent of type ε is non–
decreasing for ε1 ď ε and non–increasing after, which proves, by continuity of the utility, that
ε1 “ ε is a maximiser. If the Agent’s type is ε “ 0, his continuous utility is non–increasing with
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ε1 P p0, 1q, and a maximum is attained for ε1 “ 0. The similar reasoning can be applied if the
Agent’s type is ε “ 1, and therefore, the contract is revealing for the extreme types. For ε “ ε1
(resp. ε “ ε2), the utility is non–decreasing before ε, constant on pε1, ε2q, and non–increasing after.
Therefore, the (continuous) utility is constant and maximal on the interval rε1, ε2s, in particular
the maximum is also attained at ε1 (resp. ε2). Therefore, the conditions stated in the proposition
are sufficient for the mechanism to satisfy the IC constraint for all ε P r0, 1s.
Theorem 3.2 thus provides a characterisation of a mechanism pq, t0q satisfying the IC constraint
for all type of Agents. However, the real menu of contracts offered by the Principal must be
composed of quantities emin and a price T associated with each quantity, independent of the type
of Agent which is not observed by the Principal. So, in the end, we will have to get a price T
that is only a function of emin, not also a function of ε. Nevertheless, Lemma B.4 states that
when the function q is constant, the associated price t0 is necessarily constant too. Together with
the fact that the function q is non–decreasing, this naturally implies that if two different types of
Agents chooses the same quantity, they will pay the same price. This result therefore prevents the
contract resulting from a revealing mechanism from depending on the type of Agents.
To precisely define the menu of contract associated to an admissible revealing mechanism, let us
fix an interval I Ă R` and define rI :“ tk P R` s.t. αkωw0{pe P Iu. For a function f non–decreasing
on r0, 1s, taking values in rI, its generalised inverse for all k P rI is defined by:
f´1pkq “ inftε P r0, 1s such that fpεq “ ku. (B.6)
The following corollary allows us to give a characterisation of a sufficiently smooth admissible
menu of revealing contracts. The proof of this result is highly similar to the one of Theorem 3.2.
Corollary B.5. An admissible menu of contracts pemin, T q, for emin P I, is associated to an
admissible revealing mechanism if and only if there exists a non–decreasing continuous function q,
with values in rI and continuous second derivatives except where it is equal to 1, such that the price
T for a quantity emin “ αkωw0{pe is given for some cq ě 0 by:
T pkq “ w0 ´ cqw0eβQ0pq´1pkqq ˆ
$&%
`
1` αk˘´βq´1pkq, if k ă 1,`
1` α˘´βq´1p1qk´βq´1pkqα{p1`αq, if k ě 1. (B.7)
for k P rI and where q´1 is the generalised inverse of q, as defined in (B.6).
Proof. piq To prove that it is a necessary condition, let us fix an admissible menu of contracts
pemin, T q and an associated admissible revealing mechanism pq, t0q. Since the mechanism pq, t0q is
admissible and satisfies the IC constraint, by Theorem 3.2 we obtain that q is non–decreasing and
the price function t0 is given by (3.2) with a constant cq ą 0. Moreover, by the previous discussion
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on admissible contracts, T should be independent of ε, and thus constant when q is constant,
which is true by Lemma B.4. Hence we can write the price t0 given by (3.2) in ε “ q´1pkq, where
k :“ peemin{pαωw0q and q´1 is the generalised inverse of q. Moreover, noticing that ε ă ε1 is
equivalent to k ă q´1pε1q “ 1, and conversely if ε ě ε1 then k ě 1, the price of a quantity
emin :“ αkωw0 is given by T pkq “ w0t0pq´1pkqq which is (B.7).
piiq To prove the equivalence, let us consider an admissible menu of contracts pemin, T q where T
is given by (B.7) and assume that the function q has the right properties. First, we can show that
given this menu of contracts, the optimal quantity chosen by an Agent of type ε is emin “ αkωw0{pe
where k “ qpεq. Indeed, by computing the derivative of his utility given by (2.5) with respect to
the normalised quantity k, we obtain the following FOC for the optimal k:
0 “ ´ Bkt0pkq1´ t0pkq ` βεˆ
$’’&’’%
α
1` αk if k ă 1,
α
p1` αqk if k ą 1.
Since the derivative of t0 with respect to k satisfies:
Bkt0pkq “
$’’’’&’’’’%
βαq´1pkq
1` αk
`
1´ t0pkq
˘
if k ă 1,
βαq´1pkq
p1` αqk
`
1´ t0pkq
˘
if k ą 1,
the previous FOC is equivalent to k “ qpεq. By continuity of q, the result is extendable to k “ 1.
It remains to check the following SOC:
0 ě ´B
2
kt0pkq
`
1´ t0pkq
˘` `Bkt0pkq˘2`
1´ t0pkq
˘2 ´ βεˆ
$’’’’&’’’’%
α2
p1` αkq2 if k ă 1,
α
p1` αqk2 if k ą 1.
The second order derivative of T satisfies:
B2kt0pkq “
$’’’’&’’’’%
βα
`
1´ t0pkq
˘
p1` αkq2
´
Bkq´1pkqp1` αkq ´ αq´1pkq ´ βα
`
q´1pkq˘2¯ if k ă 1,
βα
`
1´ t0pkq
˘
p1` αq2k2
´`Bkq´1pkqk ´ q´1pkq˘p1` αq ´ βα`q´1pkq˘2¯ if k ą 1,
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thus the SOC is equivalent to:$’&’%
Bkq´1pkqp1` αkq ` α
`
ε´ q´1pkq˘ ě 0 if k ă 1,
Bkq´1pkqk ´ q´1pkq ` ε ě 0 if k ą 1.
In k “ qpεq ‰ 1, the SOC becomes in both cases Bkq´1pkq ě 0 which is true since q is non–
decreasing. By continuity of the utility, this result is also true for k “ 1. Therefore, an Agent
of type ε will choose the quantity emin “ αqpεqωw0{pe, which is an available quantity because q
takes values in rI and thus emin P I. By computing the function T pkq for k “ qpεq, and divide it
by w0, we recover the function t0 defined by (3.2), which associates to any ε the price w0t0pεq of
the normalised quantity k “ qpεq. Moreover, since the mechanism pq, t0q satisfies the assumptions
to be admissible in the sense of Definition 3.1, by Theorem 3.2, the mechanism associated to the
menu pemin, T q is admissible and satisfies the IC constraint.
B.3 ...to select the Agents
Given an admissible revealing mechanism pq, t0q, we can write the informational rent of an
Agent of type ε, as a function of ε:
∆EUQpεq “ p1` αq ln `1´ t0pεq˘` βεsU`qpεq˘.
Since pq, t0q is a menu of revealing contract, we can use the FOC (B.3) to compute its derivative:
Bε∆EUQpεq “ β sU`qpεq˘ “
$’&’%
βp1` αq ln `1` αqpεq˘ if qpεq ă 1,
βα ln
`
qpεq˘` βp1` αq lnp1` αq if qpεq ą 1.
This derivative is non–negative in both cases and implies that the information rent is non–
decreasing. Therefore, if there exists ε P r0, 1s such that ∆EUQpεq ě 0, then for all ε P rε, 1s,
∆EUQpεq ě 0, which means that the participation constraint of Agents with type ε P rε, 1s is
satisfied. A more precise result is established in Proposition 3.3, and its proof is reported below.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. We consider an admissible and incentive compatible mechanism pq, t0q.
Applying Theorem 3.2, the price t0 satisfies (3.2). Therefore, in the one hand, if ε P r0, 1s is such
that qpεq ă 1, i.e. ε ă ε1, the participation constraint of the Agent of type ε becomes:
cq ě exp
ˆ
´ β
ż ε
0
ln
`
1` αqpq˘d˙ “ cpεq.
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On the other hand, if ε ě ε1, the participation constraint is equivalent to:
cq ě p1` αq´βpε´ε1qeβQ0pεq “ cpεq.
The participation constraint for an Agent of type ε P r0, 1s is thus equivalent in both cases to
cq ě cpεq. We can then compute the derivative of c with respect to ε:
c1pεq “ ´βcpεq ˆ
$’&’% lnp1` αqpεqq if ε ă ε1,lnp1` αq ` α1` α ln `qpεq˘ if ε ą ε1.
Since qpεq ě 0 for all ε P r0, ε1q and qpεq ě 1 for all ε P pε1, 1s, we obtain that the derivative of c is
negative in both cases. Since the function c is continuous on r0, 1s (in particular in ε1), the function
is non–increasing on r0, 1s. Moreover, by definition of ε and continuity of c, cpεq “ cq. Thus, in
the one hand, for any ε P rε, 1s, we have: cpεq ď cpεq “ cq, and thus the participation constraint
of the Agent of type ε is satisfied. Conversely, for any ε P r0, εq, we have cpεq ą cpεq “ cq, which
means that the participation constraint is not satisfied.
Proposition 3.3 thus states that only the most risky Agents will be selected by the Principal.
This result is entirely implied by the fact that the reservation utility of an Agent depends on his
type, and only happens in Principal–Agent problems with countervailing incentives. Indeed, the
following remark shows that if a constant reservation utility had been chosen, the selected Agents
would have been the less risky.
Remark B.6. If the Agents’ reservation utility is assumed to be a constant R0, the participation
constraint for an Agent of type ε becomes EUQpεq ě R0, where EUQpεq is defined by (2.5) for a
revealing contract pqpεq, t0pεqq. By computing the derivative of EUQpεq with respect to ε for a menu
of revealing contracts, using FOC (B.3), we obtain:
BεEUQpεq “ p1` αqβ ln
`
ω{sω˘` β sU`qpεq˘.
Under the assumption9 that p1` αqω ď sω, the information rent EUQpεq ´R0 is decreasing for all
ε P r0, 1s such that qpεq P `1, psω{pωp1 ` αqqqp1`αq{α‰. Thus, in this case, if there exists sε P r0, 1s
such that EUQpsεq ě R0, then the participation constraint of Agents of type ε P r0, sεs is satisfied.
Nevertheless, in our opinion, it makes little sense to consider in our framework that the reser-
vation utility is constant for any Agents, regardless of their type.
9This is the case in the application considered throughout this paper, since α “ 0.08, ω “ 0.4 and sω “ 1.
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B.4 ...to solve the Principal’s problem
Corollary B.7. Let ε P r0, 1s and q P R`. If there is a solution Q P Qpεq to the ODE (3.5), the
Principal’s profit given by (3.4) is equal to:
Πpεq “ w0p1´ εq ` 12ωw0
`pε1 _ εq2 ´ ε2˘´ w0F1pQq ´ w0F2pQq,
where F1 and F2 are respectively defined as follows:
F1pQq :“
ż ε1_ε
ε
´
eβpQpεq´εQ1pεqq ` εωeQ1pεq
¯
dε (B.8a)
F2pQq :“
ż 1
ε1_ε
´`
1` α˘´βpε1_εqeβpQpεq´εQ1pεqq ` εαe 1`αα Q1pεqω¯dε. (B.8b)
Proof of Theorem 3.4 and Corollary B.7. Let us fix a mechanism pq, t0q P CQpεq. This mechanism
satisfies the assumption of Theorem 3.2, the price t0 is therefore given by (3.2). Moreover, since
this mechanism is assumed to be in CQpεq, the participation constraint has to be satisfied only
for all ε P rε, 1s, which implies by Proposition 3.3 that the constant cq in the price is given by
cq “ cpεq. We thus obtain that, if ε P r0, ε1q, the price for all ε P rε, 1s is given by:
t0pεq “ 1´ eβpQ0pεq´Q0pεqq ˆ
$’&’%
`
1` αqpεq˘´βε, if ε P rε, ε1q,`
1` α˘´βε1`qpεq˘´βεα{p1`αq, if ε P rε1, 1s.
Similarly, if ε P rε1, 1s, the price for all ε P rε, 1s is given by:
t0pεq “ 1´ eβpQ0pεq´Q0pεqqp1` αq´βε
`
qpεq˘´βεα{p1`αq.
To reconcile the two cases, we denote by Q the following function, for all ε P rε, 1s:
Qpεq :“
$’’’’&’’’’%
ż ε
ε
ln
`
1` αqpq˘d if ε P rε, ε1 _ εqż ε1_ε
ε
ln
`
1` αqpq˘d` α1` α
ż ε
ε1_ε
ln
`
qpq˘d if ε P rε1 _ ε, 1s. (B.9)
Since pq, t0q is an admissible revealing mechanism, q is continuous on r0, 1s and C2 on p0, 1q except
where it is equal to 1, and, by Theorem 3.2, q is a non–decreasing function. This naturally implies
that the function Q satisfies the right properties to be in Qpεq.
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Thanks to the definition of the function Q, we can write q as a function of Q1, for all ε P rε, 1s:
qpεq “
$’&’%
1
α
`
eQ1pεq ´ 1˘ if ε P rε, ε1 _ εq
e 1`αα Q1pεq if ε P rε1 _ ε, 1s.
Therefore, the price t0 can be written as follows, for all ε P rε, 1s:
t0pεq “
$&%1´ eβpQpεq´εQ
1pεqq if ε P rε, ε1 _ εq,
1´ `1` α˘´βpε1_εqeβpQpεq´εQ1pεqq if ε P rε1 _ ε, 1s.
Moreover, optimising on admissible revealing mechanisms pq, t0q P CQpεq is thus equivalent to
optimising on Q P Qpεq, and the Principal’s problem for ε P r0, 1s fixed is thus given by:
Πpεq “ w0 sup
pq,t0qPCQpεq
#ż ε1_ε
ε
`
t0pεq ´ εαqpεqω
˘
dε`
ż 1
ε1_ε
`
t0pεq ´ εαqpεqω
˘
dε
+
“ w0p1´ εq ` 12ωw0
`pε1 _ εq2 ´ ε2˘´ w0 inf
QPQpεq
#ż ε1_ε
ε
´
eβpQpεq´εQ1pεqq ` εωeQ1pεq
¯
dε
` w0
ż 1
ε1_ε
´`
1` α˘´βpε1_εqeβpQpεq´εQ1pεqq ` εαe 1`αα Q1pεqω¯dε+. (B.10)
This problem is relatively standard in the field of Calculus of Variation. Given the form of the
previous optimisation, we are led to study the optimal function Q separately on pε, ε1_ εq and on
pε1 _ ε, 1q.
With this in mind, we first study the problem on pε, ε1 _ εq. Let R be an arbitrary function
that has at least one derivative and vanishes at the endpoints ε and ε1 _ ε. For any η P R, we
denote g1pηq :“ F1pQ ` ηRq, where F1 is defined by (B.8a). We can compute the derivative of g1
with respect to η:
g11pηq “
ż ε1_ε
ε
´
β
`
Rpεq ´ εR1pεq˘eβpQpεq`ηRpεq´εQ1pεq´εηR1pεqq ` εωR1pεqeQ1pεq`ηR1pεq¯dε.
The Gâteaux differential of F1 with respect to Q in the direction R denoted by DF1pQqpRq is given
by g11p0q:
DF1pQqpRq “
ż ε1_ε
ε
´
β
`
Rpεq ´ εR1pεq˘eβpQpεq´εQ1pεqq ` εωR1pεqeQ1pεq¯dε.
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By computing an integration by parts and since Rpεq “ Rpε1 _ εq “ 0 by assumption, we obtain:
DF1pQqpRq “ ´
ż ε1_ε
ε
Rpεq
´
β
`
βε2Q2pεq ´ 2˘eβpQpεq´εQ1pεqq ` ω`1` εQ2pεq˘eQ1pεq¯dε.
Therefore, the Euler–Lagrange equation associated to the optimisation problem on rε, ε1 _ εs is
thus equivalent to the following non–linear second–order ODE:
0 “ ω`1` εQ2pεq˘eQ1pεq ` β`βε2Q2pεq ´ 2˘eβpQpεq´εQ1pεqq. (B.11)
Moreover, we can compute the second derivative of g1 with respect to η:
g21pηq “
ż ε1_ε
ε
´
β2
`
Rpεq ´ εR1pεq˘2eβpQpεq`ηRpεq´εQ1pεq´εηR1pεqq ` εω`R1pεq˘2eQ1pεq`ηR1pεq¯dε.
This second derivative is therefore positive for any η P R, and implies that F1 attains a minimum
for Q the solution on rε, ε1 _ εs of the ODE (B.11), if it exists.
Similarly, to study the problem on pε1 _ ε, 1q, we consider F2 defined by (B.8b). Let R be an
arbitrary function that has at least one derivative and now vanishes at the endpoints ε1 _ ε and
1. For any η P R, we denote g2pηq :“ F2pQ` ηRq. The Gâteaux differential of F2 with respect to
Q in the direction R denoted by DF2pQqpRq is given by g22p0q:
DF2pQqpRq “
ż 1
ε1_ε
´`
1` α˘´βpε1_εqβpRpεq ´ εR1pεqqeβpQpεq´εQ1pεqq ` εωp1` αqR1pεqe 1`αα Q1pεq¯dε.
By integration by parts and since Rpε1 _ εq “ Rp1q “ 0 by assumption, we obtain that the
Euler–Lagrange equation associated to the optimisation problem on rε, ε1_ εs is equivalent to the
following non–linear first–order ODE:
0 “ ωp1` αqβpε1_εq`1
ˆ
1` ε1` α
α
Q2pεq
˙
e 1`αα Q1pεq ` β`βε2Q2pεq ´ 2˘eβpQpεq´εQ1pεqq. (B.12)
Moreover, the second derivative of g2 with respect to η is positive for any η P R, which implies
that F2 attains a minimum for Q, the solution on rε1 _ ε, 1s of the ODE (B.12), if it exists.
We can thus conclude that if there is a function Q P Qpεq solution to the ODE (B.11) on
rε, ε1_ εs and to the ODE (B.12) on rε1_ ε, 1s, maximises the Principal’s profit for ε P r0, 1s and q
fixed. Combining both ODEs leads to the ODE (3.5), which proves the theorem. Moreover, using
Equation (B.10), we obtain the form of the Principal’s profit given in Corollary B.7.
Remark B.8. As explained in Remark 3.5, Theorem 3.4 only gives a sufficient condition for the
Principal optimisation problem. To obtain a necessary condition, one should adapt the previous
proof by writing the Euler–Lagrange equation for the problem with constraints. A new ODE would
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then be obtained, and the existence of a solution to this ODE would be equivalent to the existence
of an optimal contract. Nevertheless, in the application developed in Subsection 3.4, solving the
ODE (3.5) is sufficient since its solution has the required regularity. Moreover, one can prove that
the ODE has a unique solution for ε bounded away from 0, which confirms that the numerical
scheme converges to the solution of the Principal’s problem in our application. More precisely, on
rε, ε1 _ εq, the ODE (3.5) can be written as a system of two first–order ODEs as follows:$’’’&’’’%
Q1pεq “ βQpεq ´Rpεq1` βε ,
R1pεq “ 1` βε
ε
1´ 2βeRpεq{ω
1` β2εeRpεq{ω .
By Cauchy–Lipschitz Theorem, the second ODE has a unique solution if ε ě c ą 0. This solution
is in particular bounded with bounded derivatives on the interval considered, which implies that the
first ODE also has a unique solution. The same reasoning can be applied on the interval rε1_ε, 1s.
C Adding the prepayment option
The results we developed throughout this paper highlight a certain form of irrationality of
the Agents, due to their unwillingness to save money from one period to the next. Indeed, since
the Agent has only the choice between subscribing or not subscribing to the insurance, and does
not think about saving from one period to the next, he is ready to pay a very high price for the
insurance. This appendix propose a solution to address this problem of irrationality.
We consider that a regulator offers (or forces the insurer to offer) another form of contract: the
prepayment option. In this situation, the Agent can: piq subscribe at time t “ 0 to an insurance
contract; piiq prepay a quantity eP , i.e. pay at time t “ 0 the price peeP to receive eP in t “ 1; piiiq
do nothing. Adding this new option of prepayment is a way to encourage a specific form of savings,
and could limit the price of the insurance. Although some theoretical results could be obtain, we
choose in this section to only present numerical results. Indeed, the theoretical formulations are in
the same spirit as those developed throughout the paper but more complicated, so it seems more
relevant and meaningful in our opinion to discuss only the results obtained numerically, with the
parameters defined for the application to fuel poverty.
C.1 A new reservation utility
If the Agent decides to prepay at time t “ 0 a quantity eP , his utility function is defined by
(1.4), where T “ peeP is the price of the chosen quantity. As previously, we assume without loss of
generality that eP “ αqωw0{pe for some q P R`. Through easy optimisation techniques, we obtain
the following result:
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Lemma C.1. If the Agent subscribes the prepayment option for a quantity q ă 1{αω, his optimal
consumptions at time t “ 0 in each good are given by
yP0 :“ w01` α
1´ αqω
py
and eP0 :“ αw01` α
1´ αqω
pe
;
and give him the following utility: V P0 pqq “ p1` αq lnpw0q ` p1` αq lnp1´ αqωq ` Cα,pe,py .
At time t “ 1, he receives the prepaid quantity eP in any case, not only in the case of an income
loss. His utility to maximise at time t “ 1 is thus naturally defined by:
V P1 pω, qq “ maxpe1,y1qPR2` α lnpe1 ` αqωw0{peq ` lnpy1q, u.c. e1pe ` y1py ď ωw0.
By maximising this utility with respect to e1 and y1, we obtain the following result:
Lemma C.2. The optimal quantities consumed in each good at time t “ 1 are given by:
eP1 :“ α1` α
w0
pe
`
ω ´ qω˘` and yP1 :“ ωw0 ´ peeP1py ,
and provide the following utility to the Agent: V P1 pω, qq “ p1` αq lnpωw0q ` Cα,pe,py ` sUpqω{ωq.
Therefore, by Lemmas C.1 and C.2, the expected utility of an Agent of type ε who chooses to
prepay the quantity eP “ αqωw0{pe for q P r0, 1{αωq is given by:
EUP pε, qq “ EU∅pεq ` p1` αq ln `1´ αqω˘` βεsUpqq ` βp1´ εqsUpqω{sωq.
The Agent then chooses the optimal amount he wants to prepay by maximising his expected
utility over admissible q. The easiest way to solve this optimisation problem is to perform a simple
numerical optimisation to find the optimal quantity qP pεq an Agent of type ε should prepay and his
associated expected utility, denoted EUP,‹pεq, for every ε P r0, 1s. For the parameters previously
defined in Subsection 2.3, the results are presented in Figure 5.
Facing this new option, an Agent of type ε will subscribe to an insurance contract pemin, T q,
with emin “ αqωw0{pe and T “ w0t0, if and only if the two following conditions hold:
EUQpε, q, t0q ě EUP,‹pεq and EUQpε, q, t0q ě EU∅pεq. (C.1)
By Definition of EUP,‹pεq, for every ε P r0, 1s we have EUP,‹pεq ě EUP pε, 0q “ EU∅pεq. Therefore,
the second inequality in (C.1) is implied by the first and is thus not necessary. In this framework,
the reservation utility of an Agent of type ε is therefore defined by the utility he obtained thanks
to the prepayment option. To simplify the notation, we denote by ∆EUP,‹ the difference between
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the expected utility with prepayment of an Agent and his utility without:
∆EUP,‹pεq :“ EUP,‹pεq ´ EU∅pεq, (C.2)
which corresponds to the information rent in this framework.
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Figure 5: Optimal quantity prepaid and associated expected utility.
Top: the optimal quantity prepaid (blue) is compared to the quantity consumed with the initial income (dotted
green) and with an income loss (dotted red). Bottom: the maximum expected utility with prepayment (blue) is
compared to the previous reservation utility (dotted orange).
C.2 First–Best case
As detailed in Subsection 2.2, the problem of the Principal in this case is defined by (1.7),
under a new participation constraint of the Agent, since his reservation utility is now given by
EUP,‹pεq: an Agent will accept the contract if it provides him at least his utility with prepayment.
Similarly to the reasoning developed in Subsection 2.2, when the Principal knows the type of the
Agent, she may charge him the highest price he is willing to pay for the insurance. In this case,
the Agents’ informational rent are then reduced to zero, for any type ε P r0, 1s.
Using the notation (C.2), the participation constraint of an Agent of type ε is equivalent to:
t0 ď T Pmaxpε, qq :“ 1´ exp
ˆ
∆EUP,‹pεq
1` α
˙
ˆ
$&% p1` qαq´βε if q ă 1,q´βε α1`α p1` αq´βε if q ě 1,
However, contrary to Subsection 2.2, since it is relatively complicated to obtain explicitly the
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expected utility with prepayment, we cannot give a more detailed formula for the maximum price
that an Agent of type ε is willing to pay for insurance. Nevertheless, all the results can easily
be computed numerically. Figure 6 presents, from top to bottom, the quantity insured, the price
paid by the Agents, and the Principal’s profit, in the case of an insurance against fuel poverty,
i.e. with the parameters defined in Subsection 2.3. We can compare these graphs with those of
Figure 1. The most interesting point is that the price of insurance is significantly lower in this
new situation. Indeed, the price paid by the Agents is now barely higher than the actuarial price,
whereas without prepayment it was sometimes even higher than peemin, which is actually precisely
the price of the prepayment.
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Figure 6: Optimal insurance in the First–Best case with prepayment.
The blue curves represents, from top to bottom, the quantity insured, the premium and the Principal’s profit, with
respect to the probability ε. On the middle graph, the premium is compared to the actuarial price (orange curve),
which also correspond to the Principal’s cost. The red dotted line on the bottom graph is her average profit.
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C.3 Third–Best case
Since we are only changing the reservation utility, the results of Subsection 3.1 remain true. In
particular, a Principal will offer a menu of revealing contracts pemin, T q defined by Corollary B.5,
such that an Agent of type ε will choose the quantity emin “ αqpεqωw0{pe, and will pay the price
w0t0pεq given by (3.2), for a particular function q which will be optimised by the Principal. The only
thing that changes is the participation constraint, which is now given by EUQpε, q, t0q ě EUP,‹pεq.
Using the form of the price given by (3.2), this constraint is equivalent to
cq ě cP pεq :“ exp
ˆ
∆EUP,‹pεq
1` α
˙
cpεq,
where c is defined by (3.3). In Subsection 3.2, the function c being decreasing, the participation
constraint was satisfied for Agents of type ε above a specific level. Unfortunately, in this case, it is
not possible to determine precisely the variations of the new function cP , since we do not have an
explicit form for the expected utility with prepayment. More precisely, the function c is decreasing
while, as we can see in Figure 5, the difference defined in Equation (C.2) is increasing.
In the case with prepayment, it is therefore difficult to determine a monotonicity or even the
variations of the information rent. With the help of the First–Best case, we can still intuit that the
information rent in the Third–Best case is increasing up to a specific ε P r0, 1s and then decreasing.
More precisely, as can be seen on the graph with the Principal’s profit, she earns money on the
medium–risky Agents, since Agents of type ε “ 0 and ε “ 1 have no interest in subscribing to the
insurance. Indeed, on the one hand, the problem of non–risky Agents remains the same as in the
case without prepayment: the optimal quantity they would like to prepay is zero, which implies
that their utility with prepayment is equal to their utility without insurance. Their reservation
utility is therefore unchanged from the case studied throughout this paper, and these Agents are
not of interest from the insurer point of view. On the other hand, the Agents of type ε “ 1 are now
indifferent between prepayment and insurance, the two options providing them with a sufficient
quantity of energy for the futur. The riskiest Agents, who were highly courted by the insurer, are
now hard to satisfy and will instead turn to prepayment. Hence, the most interesting Agents in
this case for the Principal seem to be the intermediate ones, and she should choose the constant
cq so as to select only those Agents. Therefore, instead of maximising the integral from an ε to 1
of the benefits, she will maximise the integral of the benefit on some interval contained in p0, 1q.
Unfortunately, in order to address the Third-Best case, further study would be required. The
reasoning would be similar to the one developed in Section 3, but the non–monotonicity of the
information rent makes the problem more difficult. Nevertheless, in our opinion, this study would
be interesting since the addition of the prepayment option seems to piq allow Agents to consume
sufficient energy in case of loss of income; piiq decrease the premium compared to the case without
prepayment; piiiq allow medium–risk Agents to be insured.
55
